Archive for April, 2012

Day of the Chrysanthemum

That one image above (on Petaling Street or nearby) provides a stunning contrast to the scenes of stone throwing on Jalan TAR, Sogo, and to the melee at Dataran swarmed by Anwar Ibrahim’s men and PAS. Why?

More than any Malay, Anwar paved the way for the Chinese to enter street combat politics, an idea which many Chinese find uncomfortable until it is completely necessary. The fact that he has succeeded rests in large part on breaking the popular (Umno) perception that if the Chinese went to the streets, they did so purely to oppose the Melayu, as distinct from the government.

Hence, the woman in the scene would have to find a Chinese police officer to offer her chrysanthemum: both the flower and the colour would be meaningless to the Melayu anyway. (To the racist Perkasa and to the Anglophile Ahi Attans red on chunjie is, for example, old superstition.) Her gesture suggests however she is steeped in Chinese learning whereas the colour-blind Chinese Anglophile (Kit Siang, et al) couldn’t tell yellow from green in a traffic light. If they could, they still wouldn’t understand: that illiterate, that gweilo, are they.

But the flowers don’t diminish her concerns: she is in Petaling St seizing on an opportunity and hoping, with the flowers, the cops don’t get in the way. Anwar’s men are at Sogo on instructions and waiting for further instructions. Her concerns are to her individual, personal, genuine and are ethnic in nature (although DAP would deny it) so that if these had been un-addressed by the government and the MCA is inept, then Bersih3 offers both the cover and the vehicle to carry forward the grievances. It is a method identical to the dongzong use of the DAP. (The stupid Malaiyoos, BigCat et al, erroneously think it is the other way around.)

There is, therefore, a sea of difference in political attitudes and motivations  among the varied groups at Bersih3.

Still, the woman’s flowers – not many symbolisms are as Chinese as the chrysanthemum – have their problems. Anglophiles and Malays (indoctrinated as they are by Umno) would see her purely on racial terms. They would think she is in Petaling St for the DAP, or she comes from the DAP, or she’d vote the party.

Any of these is false because, otherwise, one would have to imagine Lim Guan Eng or Hannah Henny Yeoh and Tian Chua in particular giving out flowers to cops. (He bites them, remember?) If false, then there is reason to conclude that Bersih3 isn’t purely a political and an election event so that it becomes possible to identify those who are there for Pakatan and for a woman named Ambiga and those who aren’t. More importantly, why.

Bersih3 as an agglomeration – a confluence – of varied interests is clearly marked on ethnic terms: the Chinese were mostly on the streets of Petaling and Sultan; anti-Lynas Chinese at KLCC; PAS and Anwar’s men mostly on Jln Tun Perak and the vicinity of Dataran waiting to seize it on his signal. This means the first two groups weren’t interested in Dataran in spite of Ambiga or Anwar and whether or not they squat, sit or stand.

The potential political error in dissecting Berish’s impact is to lump everybody on April 28 as one (the lazy thinking Ahi Malaiyoos do that always), thereby losing the opportunity to drive a wedge into this agglomeration of interests. Barisan, if it is to gain electorally, must see not everybody as enemies if they are not friends. That is, there are genuine concerns – rural Chinese kids born deformed, abnormally high death rates in some places – as distinct from the usurpation of authority that Anwar is cultivating, with lawyer help.

Once those interests are identified, a window of opportunity presents itself to show that the government cares; first by acknowledging an error not of malice but of ignorance and that henceforth it would put human welfare above commercial interest. The stupid Freddie Eddies and those fat Big Cat Malaiyoos would misread into these government acts as ‘giving in’ because their life’s priorities, like Anwar’s and Lim Guan Eng’s, are weighed on the scale of win, lose or draw – that is, power – rather than the simple virtues of human concern.

Najib Razak knows that if he looks after the little things, the big things will come – naturally. And the way to start is with the woman: you know who she is, shake her hands, accept the flowers in good faith, and tell her in all sincerity – yes, the Melayu is with the Chinese because of her concerns, and this is regardless of Anwar and Guan Eng. She must be reassured in deed and in words that the Malay government is not her enemy – a point that Mahathir and the fascist SS Malaiyoos have repeatedly done so well in the past to impress upon the country. It is a legacy burden Najib must endure.

If Najib succeeds, then this cuts short the woman’s dilemma: she doesn’t have to go around looking out for a Chinese police officer to hand the chrysanthemum. And there are so few of them around, persons like Inspector Yap (pic), honourable men who would obey his superiors, act the elder brother to his Malay subordinates and, before leaving for the balai each morning, light joss sticks in honour of his ancestors and to Guan Yu 关羽, the patron of Chinese warriors. That is, he would be all the virtues that Chinese ethical culture has to throw at him or else the Inspector wouldn’t be serving as an officer of the state.

But to remain Chinese and Malaysian simultaneously is not easy without being given ching chong names, his loyalty questioned and his person shouted down by the Ahi Pendatang Attans. That time he was just lucky and so was the woman for them to have met. The Malaiyoo’s Malaysia is that hostile to the Chinese. Thanks also to Mahathir and his Attans, Umno has also left the impression that the Chinese have little to lose whoever she votes, so Najib must reconfigure this reality – for his own sake, Umno’s, and the Melayu.


Lim Kit Siang in Twitter:

Whatever our differences of views, let 428 be a day all can be proud where all Msians can gather peacefully 2exercise constitutional rights.

Typical of Anglophiles and Christians and Tricia Yeoh et al, Kit Siang has a proclivity for pontificating that makes nonsense of what he says, especially when tweeting:

  • all Msians
  • gather
  • peacefully
  • 2exercise
  • constitutional
  • rights

There are six concepts in that single clause, above. Kit Siang says those are things to agree on (hence Bersih 3.0) in spite of “our differences”.

But unpack those words it is easy to see why those concepts are in themselves the differences. Example: the Malaysian of Lim Kit Siang is not the Malaysian of Hadi Awang or Muhyiddin Yassin. And if those concepts constitute the differences, what’s is there to “gather peacefully 2exercise constitutional rights”?

Kit Siang’s own existence is itself a contradiction in terms to all Malaysians; so too the Son. (Schooled in a La Salle, he probably won’t understand what that means.)

It’s a year late into proving the claims by S Ambiga that 50,000 turned up for Bersih2 in 2011. How many exactly has just recently turned up is a moot point. But this turnout reaffirms the nagging feeling inside Barisan that Anwar Ibrahim et al are steering thereby influencing the direction of electoral politics, policies, and voter attitudes.

One result: Bersih3 has cut Najib Razak options down to one. Ignoring the insurrection that Anwar was promoting at Bersih3, Najib has to ponder whether to take up the other issues raised on that day. If he does, those issues have little time left to resolve. The clock is ticking.

But if he choses to attend to them, then, because of their urgency, the measures would have to be radical. It is to win all or nothing. Why?

Because, One, Bersih3 previews the extend to which Pakatan is willing take its political campaign. They, too, are throwing everything into it: to make up for defections, to put back the shine in Anwar’s battered image, to veil the inter-party dissensions in Pakatan’s camp.

Two, many aspects of Najib’s reforms are to Anwar et al subsidiary. They are not central anymore to electoral politics. Eight new laws later (or is it nine?) have zero effect. Law is passed today, next day they’d shit on it; “break it”, say the anointer of saints Haris Ibrahim and PKR’s Latheefa Koya.

This is one more evidence into showing why Pakatan, like the Malaysian First doctrine, the negation of a negation, is a dangerous clique. They become totalitarian and absolutist so that Haris coming round eventually to Anwar’s position isn’t an oddity but natural. Their politics boils down to this: if it ain’t yours, it has to be ours. So they (the incredibly bigoted Latheefa, for example) would say, Dataran is ‘Bersih3 territory’. So, occupy it. (This is a leaf of trick taken from Umno Baru. Recall the Mahathir and SS Malaiyoo line, ‘Malaysia is Malay land’. It’s the same principle, only different wording: What is ours can’t be yours.)

Three, Najib’s pragmatism, which has been marked by weekly constituency visits, delivering cheques, the prosecution of ex-ministers and so on, has results still impossible to gauge with any certainty. In the face of Anwar’s latest political assault and direction, they might even turn out to be marginal. Simply stated, too many stones, sometimes thrown up by Najib’s own government itself (plus those from Mahathir), litter the path of the ‘transformation’ efforts.

The diagnosis above, if true, leaves Najib without the option to pretend that the effects of Bersih3 will simply pass under the bridge. He must embark on something radical – so radical that it would make his present efforts look pale in comparison. To restate the same point, the response to Bersih3 has to go beyond mere transformation (the legal reforms, for example, didn’t work) and into the root causes leading to the multiple complaints. What? How?

One way to unravel the effects of Bersih3 might be to return to April 28 and then to deconstruct its constituents. (This ignores S. Ambiga and that which she represents since they are not critical factors. Thanks to the Pakatan mouthpiece Malaysiakini, she diverts attention from important issues). Among Bersih3 constituents are the Jalan Sultan group, green group, socialist group, the English-speakers, the liberals, the gweilo copycats, PAS, and most pertinently Anwar’s boys, the ones, like Tian Chua, who do the street fighting.

Most of these groups are just mobs, made evident once they are situated against the solitary person of Pak Samad, alone on a bridge, a figure of despair and hopelessness. He is an image of contradiction to the general but big groups of mobs, spilling from the bosom of the party membership rolls, Facebook, Twitter and Stevie Wonder Gan’s Malaysiakini.

Great writers have to face great truths alone. Yet how could Samad if, like Ambiga, he is going to answer to Anwar invariably, a man who had fooled so many people so often, Mahathir included?

Like Ambiga is a facade, Bersih is a facade, a lie that veils the contradictions and disparities of different political agendas. Stripped off its veil, Bersih3 is reducible to Chinese groups, Malays, and Anglophiles (and a near absence of Indians).

Najib’s legal reforms have brought no favourable results in large part because there is no persuading the like of ABU, the dogma of Anglophile liberalism or Tian Chua’s mob socialism or PAS Islamic fundamentalism.

Instead the first of the three groups – the Chinese – would be easiest to win over, and necessarily, because their grievances are clear cut, even genuine, and because they can be persuaded. Electorally they hold the balance that either props up Anwar and Pakatan or bring them down.

Dongjiaozong wasn’t present but anti-Lynas was. This contrast is telling because the DAP champions both. It is evidence that Wee Ka Siong’s presence at dongzong‘s Kajang assembly and his persistence in wanting to talk is paying political dividends, and this is in spite of, not because of, Muhyiddin criticisim of the dongzong.


When will these people ever get it right. Refer to man in foreground, back of camera. His T-shirt reads, ‘Malaysian in China’. Malaysian in China?

Wrong! Bodoh! It’s Chinese from Malaysia.


The word ‘Malaysian’ instead of Malaysia or Chinese is a throwback into the Malaysian First doctrine, suggesting that the street march in Hong Kong was organised and led by the DAP (like it is in Auckland, Melbourne and other gweilo cities elsewhere). This DAP jingoism has been a direct – and very effective – response to Umno’s (and the SS Malaiyoo’s) racially-charged slogan that ‘Tanah Melayu belongs to the Malay’. It is a racism that might have sustained Umno ideologically but it deter votes.

Najib is today saddled with this legacy problem which, as a direct consequence, has spilled into Bersih3 in myriad other forms such as ABU, anti-Lynas, and clean elections.

Pakatan needed a non-racial, actually an alternative to the Melayu only, approach to politics. In DAP terms, this meant in Orwellian newspeak language, ‘transcending’ race. The result of this approach has lead to an intensive search for even the most rudimentary issues and turning them political: Jalan Sultan is about heritage, anti-Lynas is environment, PPSMI and, especially, corruption which is useful to set up the Chinese as the prime perpetrator (the Baba in the Ali Baba) because PKFZ had been MCA led.

When Umno happily went along with the prosecution it proved DAP’s point: see, Barisan is corrupted especially when Chinese and Malays are in cahoots politically. In contrast, the DAP support for dongzong is far, far, far more muted.

‘Malaysian in China’ is therefore a political identity expression of the DAP approach because ‘Chinese from Malaysia’ is today taboo, contradictory and shameful.

This – Chinese and Malay, vide Umno and MCA, in cahoots produces corruption – is fundamental. It is a problem Najib ought to begin to address.

Handing out cheques to Chinese schools, Najib re-tells the Mahathir line, although in polite language, that Malaysia is the only country in Southeast Asia that observes a multiple education system. It infers, on the one hand, that Umno merely tolerates the Chinese presence. (What happens if it stops tolerating?) On the other, it suggests that the Umno Malay is the only heir of the land.

This kind of talk is politically suicidal, even if it is meant for the Malays. It also doesn’t work, not anymore, as evidenced by Berish3 and DAP’s ‘beyond race’ politics.

Worse for it, the Melayu, because the term is not an ethnicity in its common sense meaning, lacks aboriginal, moral legitimacy nor has it the force of jus sanguinis authority. The Malay is a constitutional creation. And the Chinese knows and understands all this too well.

The premise in the ‘constitutional Malay’ construction is identical to the one for Malaysian First: both makes race, both exploit and hide behind aboriginal morality, both pretend to be first, one is jingoist fascism, the other racist.

In place of this kind of talk, Najib should reassure the Chinese that the Melayu is not out to make them Melayus – which is true. Malaysia is not Singapore nor Thailand nor Indonesia, so why should this government copy what they do? Malaysia is found no where else in the world. It’s that unique.

Be what you are, he should say instead:

“The Chinese is a Chinese; the Melayu is a Melayu; the Barisan government is proud that the Chinese call themselves Chinese to who the characteristic qualities of culture and ethics endure to this day: the importance of education, filial piety, hard work, Kongzi, Mengzi, Daoism, Li Bai, the history of the Chinese civilization and so on. Lim Guan Eng isn’t proud to be Chinese; Hannah Yeoh won’t even let her daughter Shay Adora Ram be Indian, and her Chinese is only for the time being. They want to be Anglophiles, gweilos, and they are a deceitful kind of Malaysian who draw no inspiration from neither their histories nor their motherland cultures. They recognise instead the primacy of the western culture over the Chinese or Malay. They even claim English as their mother tongue.”

This corruption of the Malaysia persons and identities won’t happen as long as Najib Razak lives. (And Najib must say so, while explaining why he is spending so much time in the Chinese schools and why the PPSMI is abolished). It would be over his dead body that the DAP is going to turn a Malay or a Chinese into a piece of Anglophile sham copy. Being Chinese first or Malay first is the requisite of – the first step to – being Malaysian, first, last or forever.

Before Pakatan completely poisons the Malaysian, Malaysia should clean up, bersihkan, this country of its impostors. August 1 should be the new Bersih clean-up day. It has to be held in Dataran where the finest cultures and teachings of the native Orang Asli civilization, the Chinese, Melayu and Indian would be on display.

Chrysanthemum Day



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… at a fisherman.

Pinoys, Yanks Blow Up the 2,000-Year-Old Sea Silk Route

Because of the complexity of the subject, this series of essays is lengthy, over 4,000 words added up. (Consider reading over two sittings or more.) It also presumes a reader’s basic knowledge in international relations, Cold War geopolitics, American imperialist ideology, Chinese civilization and statehood, and the history of US intervention in Asia. Included in it are, in chronological order:

  • 南海一号The South Sea No.1 story,
  • 南沙 The South Sand islands,
  • The ‘Law of the Sea’,
  • The Christian Axis of Evil,
  • Barack Obama’s Pinoy maid,
  • China’s line in the sand,
  • China’s Yalu in the Nanhai 南海,
  • San Miguel and Esso.

South Sea Number One

About 20 nautical miles off the coast of Guangdong in 2007, China pulled out from 20 metres deep the Nanhai Number One (南海一号, model in top photo).

In contrast to Europeans, old Chinese vessels are rarely found in the sea bed for the obvious reason they are not equipped to fight, therefore vulnerable to be sunk. Chinese ships are also more stable, hence tend to be larger. Nanhai Number One is 100 ft (30m) wide and 33 ft across or 10m.

Out of the sea, the 800-year-old vessel (or 900 years) will be locked and kept submerged in sea water in a 68 m long water-tight cavernous piece of tunnel-like structure (above, the Maritime Silk Route exhibition centre in Guangdong’s Yangjiang 阳江 ).

When found buried in silt Nanhai Number One was completely intact with 60,000-80,000 pieces of merchandise so it probably sank not from a battle but in a storm soon after leaving port during the Song era (960-1279AD). European ships did not reach the size of Nanhai Number One until the time of Portuguese Goa and Malacca in the late 15th Century and early 16th.

This meant that in size and ocean going capability Song vessels (as opposed to the earlier Tang dynasty or the latter Ming era ships) preceded European ones by 200-500 years, and better. The 200-500 year range depends on the date of Nanhai’s construction, which was during the 300 year-long Song period. By the time of Zheng He, the largest Ming ships were each 400 ft long with a carrying capacity of 1,000 (that’s aircraft carrier size.)

A part of the Nanhai hull with its cargo of coins and gold items.

The Maritime Silk Route

There are, however, more important reasons to view Nanhai Number One than its comparison to European marine engineering.

One, it’s the ship’s name 南海. This is also the present hanzi name of the South China Sea. Two, the nature of its contents: some bundles of silk and cotton, gold ornaments, silver ingots, copper coins, some from circa 100 AD, but lots of bowls, plates and pots, maybe even chopsticks if they are still preserved. (Contents of Nanhai: see this.) This seems banal except for one fact, the porcelain are multiple colours: red, pink, magenta, violet and hues of green and yellow. Tang pottery tended to be mainly hues of grey and blue over white, so multiple colours confirm the Song era dating.

Chinese commoners, even today, use rather thick, coarse bowls and plates of grey and blue so that the qualitative and colour differences suggest that the Nanhai shipment (it was certainly not pre-ordered since insurance was non-existent then) was intended for sale to some relatively rich people. Who? Where? Pendatang Chinese in Malacca? ‘Malays‘? Indians? Arabs? Or (those accursed) white people? It is more likely to be all the above so that the Nanhai Number One shipment was probably wholesale cargo. Thus, somewhere in ‘peninsula Malaya’ or ‘Malacca’ or nearby (say, Acheh) is a warehouse to serve as a redistribution centre for the goods to Arabia and Europe.

The veracity of these speculations will be impossible to confirm. But two critical pieces of information emerge from the archaeological evidence.

One, a clear and well-used network of sea trading routes between China and Southeast Asia, extending to the Indian subcontinent and Arabia, first appeared from the start of the Tang dynasty, 1400 years ago. This reaffirms ancient records that spoke of voyages into the South China Sea during the Han period (206 BC-220 AD). By the time of the Song, 800 years later, shipping cargo was routine business.

In popular literature this network is the Maritime Silk Route, reaching its height at the time of pre-Malacca Zheng He, circa 1402. (Why? See map of the trade routes further below. North of the Great Wall, gangs of tribesmen, actually bandits, were roaming central Asia and they made difficult and hazardous overland movement. The land is vast so the emperor’s soldiers can only do so much.)

Two, Chinese history is closely bound to Malaysia and Southeast Asia. It is bound by international trade, by mutual exchanges, and by the free movement of shipping at a time once unhindered by colonisation and by white people, Europeans and Americans today. The latter of the two now say they are prowling the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca to guarantee free movement of shipping from Chinese hegemonic designs. (The western media says that all the time.)

This won’t be so incredulous if even the Americans believe their own propaganda (helped spread by the like of Reuters, Bloomberg, UPI, plus their Anglophile minions such as Asia Times and Malaysiakini).

Top of the two maps above: Tang era map of Asia, Arabia and India. Zheng He probably referred to it when sailing off from Fujian Quanzhou. Below it is the subsequent improvement.

One thousand years before the Europeans in Asia, the Prophet also knew about China. Did he not say: “Seek knowledge as far as China”. Below, Guangzhou mosque from around 1100. Exact location, unknown. Present status, unknown.

Chinese names given to islands and places in Terengganu as early as the Han era, fr.206 BC, and after that Sui fr.581 AD. Tang and Song currency coins have been found in Terengganu. (This illustration didn’t come from the Chinese.)


Nansha: the South Sand islands

‘A’ is the point of the joint China-Russia naval drill held this week. Next time they should hold it at the doorsteps of the Los Angeles customs office. Yankees do it all the time, outside other people’s windows, Pyongyang for example, and say that’s in the American ‘national interest’.

Below: the spice and silk routes beginning not long after the Han dynasty founding, extending to the Tang, Song and ceased finally during the Ming when Europeans arrived. Silk, porcelain, cloth came from China. The spices would come from east of Borneo, the Malubu islands. Note that this maritime silk route passes the Nansha islands (anglicised Spratlys) at a time when the Philippines didn’t exist – not in any form.

An identical pattern exist today although it is Singapore that has taken over the distribution roles of Malacca and Acheh and the goods are oil, electronics, clothing, toys and grain. Americans, helped by Singaporeans, have instead stepped in, in place of Europeans, to control the supply chain.

If the Pinoys succeed at Nansha then they, with the Americans, would have a stranglehold on China’s entire trade passing the South China Sea that had been unhindered for 2,000 years. America would realise its dream of ‘containing’ China – for whatever ‘national interest’ cause.


Chinese Statehood vs Western Legalism

China’s civilization, its people and its state are so old and well established that their existence today made redundant and a mockery of the present set of international legal regime governing statehood and and property claims.

For example, a country’s claim on any offshore property is strengthened when evidence is produce to the effect the claimant had exercise jurisdiction and had developed that property. Forms of jurisdiction control would be maps and official historical records, such as proclamation or edicts. By development it would mean some tangible presence: people, houses, currency, tombstones, even a lighthouse.

On those basis, Chinese sovereignty would extend south of Hainan as far as parts of Indonesia such as Palembang, sweeping up others in between, Vietnam for example. Conversely, the Anglos would lose all rights to America, and they to be repatriated back to Europe – or to be thrown into the Atlantic. Life is to the mighty however….

Yet, this isn’t the way the Chinese think nor act. Which is to say, western legal injunctions such as the Law of the Sea (the UNLOS) isn’t in the Chinese vocabulary or thought or ethical culture. On the contrary it says this, fundamentally: fight to keep what’s yours, pay for what isn’t, return what’s borrowed, and anything in between share.

One might call it a ‘principle’.

Anyway one looks at it, this principle helps explain why the Chinese and their state, China, are always an inward-looking race; that is, mind your own business. (But gweilos and Anglophiles call this insularity racism all because the Chinese won’t buy into their Christianity, i.e. their model of life.) It also helps explain why many economic crimes such as embezzlement and crimes committed by public officials are in China capital crimes – punishment is death. It explains why, in spite of far superior armoury and numbers, Chinese long distance voyages abroad, in particular to Southeast Asia, first since the Han, next Sui, then the Tang period, 1,300 years before the arrival of Europeans, did not result in conquest or land grab.

Today, the enabling mechanism for any Chinese property claim is paradoxically not Chinese ‘assertiveness’ – the word the western media used to malign Chinese – but the law the west had constructed. But these laws are full of contradictions.

Consider the 370 km (200 nautical mile) exclusive economic offshore zone that grants the ‘right’ (that word again) to jurisdictional and development of, say, an island. The resulting problem isn’t just overlapping claims among claimants – who has greater ‘right’ – but also actual ownership.

The two same concepts – the claimant’s right and ownership – collide in the Nansha islands (anglicised Spratlys) in the middle of the South China Sea.

This returns to the western concept of the state and how it is at odds with Chinese civilization and culture.

If the Chinese were to open its historical records (archived today in Ningbo, Xi’an and Beijing) then many states today won’t have the right to exist – on account of international (actually western) law. But what good would that do? What purpose would it serve? How would say an ownership claim be enforced? In another way of stating the same problem: How are the native populations of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand to reclaim their sovereignty and rightful rule from the white European populations?

Westerners adopt the equivalence of jurisidictional and development control as equal to ‘right’. Native American or Australian aborigines also have rights over their property except that the right is not enforceable by a ‘state’; that is, they hadn’t gone about creating a state on western terms or rules. Malacca statehood, for example, was a moveable thing as opposed to a fixed geography that white people would fight over in Europe over two world wars. Thus, when the white man arrived, guns blazing, the resident population simply shipped out.

And such differences in concepts stem from differences in civilization and culture, but for history which is told only by west today. Once white outnumbered natives, then that history is cemented as western history. They say, for example, America is such a wonderful place because it has democracy – the vote – so that no matter how hard the natives shout for the restoration of their rights, or state, they don’t have the vote to enforce it.

All of which says, statehood, in the western concept, has its origins at the point of the gun. Because, if this is true, then it follows that jurisdictional claim (over Nansha for example) tends to be settled by force.

In another way of saying the same thing: you first grab the land, next built your lighthhouses and some army barracks, and then wait. Long enough, the island is yours; the claim of sovereign control is thus established.

This western idea of the state – brutish and by force – contrast sharply against the Chinese idea of statehood. France is an ideological state; America is a legalistic state, an artifice; China is a civilization, and a very natural one. It explains why the Chinese consider westerners as barbarians – the term gweilo is reserved for white people only.

It also explains why Chinese statehood is primarily preoccupied with cultivating, instructing and educating its own citizenry into the virtues of culture, ethics and conduct that are written into its history. From a historical perspective, it is least bothered about grabbing land and overseas possessions that are the dominant feature – even today – of white societies everywhere. It is rarely, if at all, about political geography or nationalism (which is western). The Chinese state therefore sees itself as a pinnacle of a cultural entity; the Chinese state is a cultural state not a military or a political tool to serve property expansion. (The Law of the Sea, created by the west, is fundamentally property expansion out into the sea.)

All this explains why China has done next to nothing to ‘assert’ its sovereignty – granted by the west – on Nansha and other islands between Taiwan and Japan. (See maps. Nansha or Spratlys is not to be confused with the Paracel islands the Chinese call Xinsha 西沙群岛 which is administered directly by Hainan.)

Alliance of US-Pinoy Provocations

But, these Chinese perceptions of themselves have since, the arrival of the white man on Chinese soil, shifted in marked terms.

And then something happens in between.

Chinese fishermen are seized, searched and and detained while fishing. Japan did it once. To justify the arrest, Japan lied to say the fishermen tried to ram its gunship but leaked footages, from within the Japanese authorities, showed it was the other way around.

Some days ago, a Flipino warship, its largest vessel given to it for free by the Americans, blocked entry and exit of an island in the Nansha group, in order to detain some Chinese fishermen taking shelter there from a storm. And the island is 180 km from any land point in the Philippines. (This harrassment must be seen in the light of an event last year when the Filipino government provoked – literally – one of its ex-policeman to shoot dead eight Chinese tourists held by him as hostages in a bus.)

All of which is to say there have been one set of provocations after another. But these provocations, notice, do not concern island claims.

The Japanese and Filipino gunships were moving around those islands at will; no Chinese warship has come up to challenge them or tell them to stay out of Chinese property.

Instead, the provocations involve some fishermen doing what Chinese fishermen do – fishing for nearly 2,000 years in these waters. Chinese records spoke of the maritime silk trade route, 1000 years before the Philippines or America was invented as a state. This route had hopped Chinese from coastal point to coastal point until the they reached India and Arabia because it was too dangerous to go overland or across Xinjiang. (It was the barbarians – bandits – on the northern plains.)

In the western media (Reuters, UPI, Bloomberg), China is often blamed for these provocations. How? China, they would say, is “expanding its sphere of influence”; that it has been “assertive”; that it is building a naval arsenal, and so on. America steps in, it says, to “protect” the “freedom of the international sea lanes”.

Any of these excuses would not be ludicrous if the Americans even believe their own propaganda. Worse for it, American promises to contain China’s sphere of influence, to protect, and to offer freedom were laughable – even if true. The Chinese have been going up and down the South China Sea for 2,000 years, trading, making no claims, seizing no property, and the Americans now discover – 2,000 years later – that China has hegemonic designs for the place.

What have the Chinese done to hurt America, 8,000 km away, to deserve their venom?

Over and over and over and over and over, again and again and again and again, China in speech and in acts or by not acting have attempted to work with various parties to solve the disputes.

Excepting under UN obligations, China is the only major power without a single soldier stationed in another country. It has no so-called “defence treaties”. For the most part it has left Nansha alone, as it is with dozens of other islands. Every invasion and attack on China (by Japan, Europe and America) the last 100 years have come from the sea and from the south especially – the South China Sea in particular.

But these concerns and China’s sincerity are instead brushed off and interpreted as duplicity in the way Anglo-Americans and Anglophiles tend to be deceitful. It is today even seen as weakness: Chinese humanist traditions act to deter the Chinese to get involve in any fight. (In the belligerence cultivated in his Anglophile mind, Peter Petra the Piper see the weakness as Chinese cowardice: the Chinese won’t dare take on the Umno Melayu.)

On the international platform therefore, the Chinese is intepreted as the ball-less coward who wouldn’t dare take on America so the Pinoy maid could act like the tough mama, boss of a regional brothel with Yankee thugs behind her.

(To elicit international sympathy, Anglophile Filipino reporters, coached by Americans, would paint a confrontation with the Chinese in typical white, biblical terms: a lone, helpless David vs a barbarous Goliath. Brown people are so nice, innocent and pure. See for example this brown-outside, white-inside piece of coconut named George Amurao).

These people underestimate the Chinese. They also underestimate the deep hurt and suffering the Chinese have had to endure for decades because of American imperialism in Vietnam, Korea, China mainland, today in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The Chinese remember their history. In the battle of Guandu (circa 200 AD, Three Kingdoms era), 10,000 were killed in a single day along the Huang (Yellow) River, and that was with just knives and arrows. China has fought countless wars, mostly with itself and most were not worth it. But today it will be against a foreign provocateur and army.

Foreign perceptions of the Chinese, all erroneous, raises a problem. Instead of looking at the merits of a territorial dispute, the Filipino, like white racist, prefer to spit at China. The Pinoy, believing she has God, the Pope and Uncle Sam by her side could therefore provoke and provoke and provoke. She does so on the assumption the Chinese don’t have a stomach for a fight.

But then Chinese civilization was never plain sailing either; it is patient. It has taken the Chinese 5,000 years to reach this state, and are they to give it all up because of some brothel woman in Clark?

If China did – give it up – what would it be for the millions upon hundreds of millions of dead, the forefathers of our forefathers in whose name the Chinese endure? Before the Pinoy whore, there were the Portuguese chaplain, the English trader, French governor, the German preacher, the Japanese katana, and then American navy captain.

The Chinese are sick and tired of being pushed around especially on their own backyard.

The Filipino maid, on the other hand, has no idea – absolute none – what it is to look into a sea of red and dead Pinoys. The Chinese have been there – in those circumstances, many, many, many times – so many, many that it would sink Malacanang in under 5 seconds.

We’ll see who has a stomach or no stomach for the dead…. Of course, the good Christian Pinoys will end up in heaven and the infidel Chinese will be in hell. But that’s okay.

The Christian running dog is pushing his luck.



  • The EEZ, exclusive economic zone, is a mere extension of state power. EEZ is a sea zone over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources, including production of energy from water and wind. It stretches from the seaward edge of the state’s territorial sea out to 200 nautical miles (370 km) from its coast.
  • The South China Sea is so crowded (almost 2 billion people) with more than a dozen countries, it is today impossible to settle over who has a right greater than another to develop the area.
  • China’s policy position is that its sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Nansha islands is historical and indisputable. Chinese records on those aspects are as long and as old as the Great Wall. This does not mean it would not share development of the property with others in the same way it has lend its land for the use by other countries.
  • At some point, after the 13th general elections, Najib Razak will have to decide: act or do nothing. If he acts, how. If Pakatan wins, there is no doubt Anwar Ibrahim will bring in the Americans into the Nansha dispute and he’d use them as he would a Pinoy prostitute.
  • Once the whole business gets very messy, it will be the first time in 2,000 years, that everybody, China in particular, has to ask the permission of Philippines and America to use the Maritime Silk Route.
  • If the Yanks want war, thence to be serviced out of a Pinoy brothel house called Clark, then this imperialism would have to be settled once and for all.


Postscript Note to Malaysians, Ahi SS Malaiyoos included.

The line in the sand: the South Sea Yalu

The Nansha dispute is serious, growing in severity by the week. Its deterioration is faster than even the anticipations of the Chinese in Beijing who are seldom wrong in their calculations. Where is it headed?

An accurate answer to the question first requires you to unveil the propaganda produced (and written in the English, naturally) by the pro-American Anglophile reporters in AFP, Reuters and others.

One way to do this is, go back to the Nansha map (above). All the 700 specks of reefs, grass and beaches when added up amounts to no more than 4 sq km, barely enough to land a Boeing 747. Some helicopter pads could be built (Taiwan has one), but not as a military facility because it would be so open to the clear tropical sky two cruise missiles launched whether from a ship or aircraft will put a hole so big as to sink the whole place. It is that small and vulnerable.

Although the area has been in dispute for a long time, you – anybody – could still fish there and sun bath in its beaches (if you can get there). And precisely because it is in dispute, nobody has sunk a test well to see if there is any oil or gas so that media reports of bountiful reserves are meant to ramp up the stakes (and point it out as proof that China is greedy). There has only been mapping surveys. And note that the continental shelf around the Philippines or Taiwan or Vietnam has no existing oil extraction going on, suggesting that the Nansha is only good for fishing and Ambiga’s LGBT people.

But, and this is a big but, if you were sailing up to China in a bulk cargo ship from, say, Singapore with Penang electronics or refined Arabian crude you are bound to see those reefs and atolls. Look hard enough you might even see a stingray. The shipping route is that close.

Conclusion: the Nansha has no military value, some economic worth, and good only for a day-trip.

So what does the Pinoy want with the property when Benign-no-more-Aquino can’t even manage the thousands of Philippine islands from disintegrating into jihadist bombs, much less to feed his people? For the answer look to the Americans who, it must be recalled, view China today by how they once viewed Russia, that is, by Cold War standards: how to fix the Chinese. In geopolitical language: containment.


The answers as to ‘why’ are beyond the scope of this postscript, but a series of American and Filipino provocations (killing of Chinese tourists, harassing fishermen, physically occupying more islands, war games) are suggestive. Those provocations rest on a number of critical assumptions, related to Cold War calculations:

  • China won’t conduct a first strike;
  • China won’t go nuclear with the bomb;
  • China has no military capability nor weaponry to fight a sustained fight;
  • China has too much to lose, that is, ships and goods going back and forth; and especially this,
  • Hansha isn’t worth fighting over.

In all of these assumptions, the US refuses to acknowledge that Chinese ships, people and goods – hence jurisdiction – have been in these waters a thousand years longer than even both the Philippines and the US have been in existence, combined.

The only ‘right of claim’ the Philippines has on the Nansha is a piece of so-called law made up in the west. Nothing else. It can’t even make a case for Sabah, much less use the UNLOS as an excuse so that, all said and done, the Pinoy would be swathing flies in their Luzon Clark brothels, without clients and starving, and without the Americans and their promises of economic handouts.

The Chinese sovereignty claim is historical and steeped in its civilization. Would the Chinese therefore stepped backwards and let the Americans boss around the place?

This returns to the question in the beginning: what’s going to happen?

For that answer go back to the Korean peninsula war.

The Americans had then invaded the north on the same assumptions that the Pinoys held of the Chinese today. Thus, when the Americans reached the northern Korean border with China, the latter sent more than a million soldiers across the Yalu river. Surprised by China’s involvement, the Americans were pushed back until a standoff that is now marked by the north-south Korean border.

Nansha is not some place like some distant playground of holidaying white Americans such as Hawaii is to the US. But Aquino’s boy like to think on those terms, especially since the thinking has come with his allegiance to white Christian culture: he probably thinks the Chinese is a bunch of stupid godless infidels. Benigno Aquino as a Christian racist – and a coconut to boot – is not a discovery of fact.

But if he is wrong – and he is – then he will go on and on with his provocations so that one day, the Chinese might like to finish off Makati and Manila and so start anew. It will be just one strike – better nuclear. There’ll be no need for soldiers and guns. After that let’s see if Barack Obama, black man who acts whiter than white, will risk Los Angeles, San Francisco and the entire West Coast for his good Christian buddy.

If the Chinese are going die, choked to death in their own backyard, then together lets die (paraphrase from an old Chinese saying).

Some ramifications:

  • Taiwan will be a step closer to reunification with the mainland.
  • Hong Kong’s peg to the USD would have to decouple.
  • Unwind all USD asset holdings; the dollar as a reserve and trading currency is finished anyway in the long term.
  • Sell the Filipino market and especially those Esso shares that the Pinoy is collecting.

And Ahi Attan: tell your Mahathir’s boys to forget San Miguel. They will be holding a hot potato too late to dump, and no buyers. Consider this as stock tip – no charge, Malaysian to Malaysian.

Above, an envelope from the 南沙宮, that is, Nansha magistracy (meaning government office). Rather than as a postal item, it was probably used for a ceremonial purpose, a temple perhaps. Actual print date is unknown but it was acquired by the Taiwan Museum in 1985 after it was found on one of the islands Taiwan controls.

From above, the atolls in Nansha look as the Chinese had long ago pictured them in metaphorical references, 萬里石塘 which says Stone Pools by the Thousands or this 千里長沙 A Thousand Strings of Sand.

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Welcome Comrade… A Warm Welcome





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Reposting: By Mahathir Mohamad’s own admission (in The Malay Dilemma and elsewhere), the Malay seizure and occupation of Malaysia equals the white man’s invasion of America and Australia. As Anglo-Saxons later came to confer upon themselves the ultimate ruler and authority on those lands, so did the Malays on the peninsula, Sabah and Sarawak. White man even wrote that down for the Malays, in the English, into the constitution. The result? It’s below from a posting two years ago. No wonder the Umno Malay is so hated by close to everybody else but tolerated by the MCA Chinese because of Kongzi.

If Malay supremacy equals White supremacy isn’t perverse enough, Anglophiles, among both the DAP Chinese and Malays, the Bangsa types, hold up America and Australia as ‘democratic’ models to run Malaysia. But this was predictable: Malaysia was sired by the same Anglo-Saxons who seized Australia and America. White people even taught Malays how to write in the Roman alphabet. Thus, when PAS converts Kedah into Ayatollah rule, it becomes just dessert for the Anglophiles, the Tunku Aziz and Rahmans, Mahathir’s sons, Peter Petras, the Lim Family, the Hannahs, Thomases and so on.


Remember Omar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the 23-year-old man who boarded a flight in Amsterdam on Christmas Day with a bomb in his underpants? He may be Nigerian with Islamist connections in Malaysia but he was bred in … England.

Says Wole Soyinka (above), the Nigerian novelist and playwright (The Bacchae of Euripides): “England is a cesspit. England is the breeding ground of fundamentalist Muslims. Its social logic is to allow all religions to preach openly. But this is illogic, because none of the other religions preach apocalyptic violence. And yet England allows it.”

Why is Britain the way it is? asks Tunku Varadarajan of Soyinka. Answer: “This is part of the character of Great Britain. Colonialism bred an innate arrogance, but when you undertake that sort of imperial adventure, that arrogance gives way to a feeling of accommodativeness. You take pride in your openness.” And so it is, he says, that Britain lets everyone preach whatever they want: It confirms a self-image of greatness.

For a taste of this British accommodation and openness, consider its human rights regime. Another one coming up under that regime is the Equality Bill, which forbids discrimination by anyone or any organisation, that is, private entities, on grounds of say ethnicity and religion. It sounds uplifting and liberal, but it makes being human a crime because if one were to be running, say, a newspaper for PAS it would be perfectly natural to hire only those subscribing to its religious ethos no matter how beastly. The Equality Bill makes this discrimination criminal; in England it compels the Church to hire minorities, communists, gays, ulamas, the riff-raff. Says the commentator Tim Black:

At issue here is freedom of association. At the most personal, intimate level, this is a freedom we take for granted. It’s the freedom to choose one’s company, to choose who one associates with and who one doesn’t. … As (a) part…, this freedom to give shared beliefs or interests an organisational form, others, who do not share those beliefs or interests, will be excluded … discrimination goes hand-in-hand with freedom of association.”

If all this seems elementary – that, perversely, equality means to be indiscriminate; that being human, to love and to despise, is naturally discriminatory as an intrinsic quality – they are not to Britain, not anymore, because the Brits are no longer capable of even little individual judgements. All everyday human decisions are reduced to weighing between the legal and the illegal; human relations are surrendered to the Law, the State, which then decides who you may employ, to who you let your house, with who you sleep with, and so on. An Islamic state is its perfect mirror reflection. Such a state legislate human relations under the veneer of Islam, while secular Britain under the religiosity of liberalism. Yet, beneath both, they serve totalitarian fascism. (In this respect, what Anwar Ibrahim said about Lina Joy, that she must not be permitted to alone decide her religion on her IC, is revealing into the man’s fascism but hidden under a liberal veneer when Anwar stands talking in front of White people and by the facade of Islam in front of Malays.)

Now, if England is a cesspit, and the world’s greatest exporter of terrorists, what does that make of Malaysia? The sewage, the excrement for the sump? Possibly. After the Nigerians, Petra Kamarudin is said to have gone there. Here is a fetid, mosquito swamp overflowing with the surplus that must go somewhere; a country bursting in the seams with the narcissistic illiterates of the royal wanted list (Petra), the fascist (Ibrahim Ali), the Pendatang (Rusdi Mustapha), the elite racist (Mahathir Mohamad), the Bangsa Allah types (Haris Ibrahim), the Islam-or-nothing ustaz (Zulkifli Noordin), the Islam-For-All ulama (Hasan Ali), and of course, at the top of the pecking order, the new politics ayatollah and prophet (Anwar Ibrahim).

So, what is one to do with this very Islamic, motley crew of religious pinheads? How to save the country? Soyinka’s answer extended to Malaysia:

“I think this is where our rocket engineers and astronauts can come to our rescue. We should assemble all those who are pure and cannot abide other faiths, put them all in rockets, and fire them into space.”

Soyinka, however, doesn’t dwell on one other point: why do the Islamists, even if they don’t actively seek out Britain, invariably end up there or at its Anglo-Saxon cousins, Australia*, New Zealand, USA? Why do Malaysians, for example the self-anointed Islamic half white, half Indonesian brown Petra Kamarudin, harbour this desire to run away (as Eli Wong also did) and hide in a White man’s country every time the local authorities go after them? One answer is that Malaysia and these countries share a common heritage in an invasive legalist state, a certain political culture alluded to earlier. The other probable answer, although it is only an inferential one, comes from another novelist, Kazuo Ishiguro (above; The Remains of the Day, Nocturnes), who himself grew up and still lives in England. Says he:

“(T)here’s a very complicated relationship between Britain and its old colonies — India, the Caribbean, Nigeria, and so on. And the educated elite in those countries have been taught in very English schools. They’ve grown up aspiring to a certain English model of life…”

An English model of life? In another word, Anglophile. Other than Petra or Mahathir, consider as well the good Christian Thomas Lee, the Tian Chuas (Help! Police brutality. They took my lollipop, call CNN.), the Khoo Kay Kims (Either you let me copy the history of the Khoo clan or I’ll call my mother.), and the editors at Malaysiakini and The Star (cakap orang putih). Don’t they fit Ishiguro’s description neatly?

*Postscript: Australia

What took them so long? India’s Indians are discovering belatedly that Australia (among others) is the fruit of the White man’s land grab, historically cloaked in supremacist, condescending attitudes toward natives but today veiled by the facade of human rights and democracy. Of course, the white minions and their underlings in, for example, the Malaysiakini crowd, Manjit Bhatia (living off Australia), Steven Gan (Australian alumnus), et al, have next to nothing to say when Indians are persistently set up as targets by White mobs (1,447 crimes against Indians in 2007-08 in Victoria alone). Saying anything betrays their English model of life. However, with nothing to lose, Outlook India has just released a complete back-to-back cover job:

Some relevant quotes:

No one messes with a Chinese because fellow nationals run to his aid. The Indian runs to the Press.

Travelling on a train sometime back, I was ashamed, as you could hear the choicest Punjabi abuses.

(The White government) tells them (Indians), you can come here but never to speak your language or pursue your culture the way you want. It’s a different banner under which you are kept.

There is a culture of racism that comes from our schools, our education system. The dominant culture in Australia is a racist culture.

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不好意思 您会有这样的想法. 有可能 我们是站在两个不同世界或观点. 势不两立. 为了正确路线您割鸡焉用牛刀.

您感觉更好吗 听说您发病. 保重…


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A Cool People…

The Chinese are a cool lot.  Yet, the Anglophile Malays, the Malaiyoos, make it a national hobby to spit on them. Why…?

(Answer at the bottom*)


The Chinese is among the world’s coolest peoples. Here’s evidence, and it’s a verdict delivered by, of all persons, that Yankee racist media called CNN.

In Malaysia, they are banned. Nor could you get away with these… 

Cool people above, much to the chagrin of Malaysiakini‘s Stevie Wonder Gan and that incredibly jealousy-proned Hannah Yeoh. All that freedom: it is owed to this man…

No, no. Not that below. Those are Japs.

Another cool evidence: Where in the world or what people makes a fashion and movie hero out of street beggar? Only the Chinese….

The pauper, right, nicknamed by the Chinese 犀利哥, that is,  Brother Sharp (here, with video). In Selangor, Elizabeth Wong will tell her municipal goons to arrest him for vagrancy, that he can’t smoke in public, yada, yada, yada. Left, the movie copycat actor named Carl Ng, not even half as good looking.

Since the Chinese are so cool, vote MCA. They are Chinese. No? Then vote Barisan.

What about the Malaiyoos, Malaysiakini, Stevie Wonder Gan, the DAP, Hannah Yeoh and their evangelists?

They are straight-laced, fire breathing fascist bigots.

Steven Bow Tie Gan impresses the Americans so much, BusinessWeek put him into their pages. Then there is Hannah Henny Yeoh: short, fat, freckles, pimples; everything is there in that  face.


And Lim Guan Eng?

*He’s not even Chinese, for Christ sake! He is an Anglophile tyrant-to-be. Christian to boot. Ptui!

Hannah Yeoh, Lim Guan Eng tombstone sample.


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Busy, busy, busy… 

China – Myanmar – Asean

Myanmar held parliamentary elections for a limited number of seats early this month, and the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), achieved a landslide victory under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, who herself won a seat in parliament. Has Myanmar’s political landscape been fundamentally changed or is this just another show of democracy? Phoenix TV (PTV) talked to Du Ping (Du), a commentator on global politics, on these issues.

PTV: What do you make out this victory of the NLD? What are its implications for Myanmar’s political prospect?

Du: A very unusual sign of progress. Of course this is not the first democratic election in Myanmar.

Back in 1990, the NLD already won 59 percent of the national votes and 81 percent of the seats in the parliament. Back then Suu Kyi’s victory was denied by the military junta, and she herself had already been placed under house arrest before the 1990 election.

Twenty years later, the government of Myanmar finally took a small step forward.

However small this step is, it is a hard-earned progress to allow the opposition party to compete for power in a country that is widely viewed from the outside as an autocracy.

But what it means for Myanmar’s political prospect or its process of democratization depends on a lot of factors.

Anyway this election is still praiseworthy. The military-backed Myanmese ruler, Thein Sein, seems to be willing to answer both domestic and outside calls for reform.

Under pressure from the international community, he has made the right decision to push forward political reform.

Why he made such a decision or what his true motives are is another question.

PTV: You have said democratic reform like this is hard-earned progress that deserves praise for Myanmar. But what does this reform mean for the international community? Since Myanmar is a member state of ASEAN, what influence will the reform have on its relationships with the other nine members of ASEAN? Will it impact Myanmar’s relationship with China?

Du: First of all, since Thein Sein assumed office, he has been making efforts to convince the Western countries to lift sanctions on Myanmar after years of diplomatic isolation and economic and military sanctions.

Although the reformists are not in the majority of the ruling party and there could be some irregularities regarding the fairness of the election, I believe Thein Sein will keep his promises to reform.

Considering the regional politics, the reform is conducive for Myanmar to play a more active role in regional cooperation as a member state of ASEAN.

Despite opposition from the US and the EU, ASEAN resisted the pressure and admitted Myanmar as a member on the ground of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.

But ASEAN has been under heavy criticism for that and has actually exerted a certain influence on Myanmar’s domestic politics.

This election could make other ASEAN member states recognize that Myanmar is gradually changing, which can definitely take off some of the pressure imposed on ASEAN. As for Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN, the ASEAN countries are willing to let Myanmar serve as the chair of ASEAN and host the Southeast Asian Games.

China, as Myanmar’s biggest neighbor, has maintained a good relationship with the country for quite a long time.

Though Myanmar seems to be on a development path toward Western style democracy, China at first wasn’t so sure about its future. Because it is not clear what political paths Suu Kyi and her NLD will take.

PTV: So China had its worries about Myanmar’s future?

Du: In my opinion, China should embrace Myanmar’s positive progress in democratic reform.

In other words, if through the democratization process, a national reconciliation between parties and factions could take place, it won’t be a problem for China to cooperate with Myanmar in all aspects.

Because China already cooperates with almost all democratic countries very smoothly, there’s no way Myanmar will be an exception to that. However, Suu Kyi has yet to run the country herself. It will take a really long time. I think China should take a positive view of Myanmar’s democratization process.

PTV: Suu Kyi and her NLP have achieved a landslide victory in the by-elections and will become a very strong opposition party in the parliament. Since she has been under home arrest for 15 years and she has a long history of providing a dissenting voice, will she serve as a powerful watchdog over the Myanmar government?

Du: Even if Suu Kyi’s party had won all the seats up for grab, these would still be less than 10 percent of the total 600 seats available in the parliament. That doesn’t leave her in all that strong a position. As for whether she could serve as an effective watchdog over the government, I don’t think we should be too optimistic about it.

Why? Suu Kyi has been opposing the military junta for the past two decades. The more uncooperative you are, the less influence you can wield on the existing regime.

Once you get into the regime, aside from being a watchdog, moderate cooperation is also necessary to showcase your influence. Or you will have a very limited political influence as a result.

Hence, her party is now in a difficult position. On the one hand, they need to cooperate with the current regime; on the other hand, they need to function as the opposition party. So she should take a delicate and nuanced stand in order to exercise more influence.

Uncles Sam by the Side, Pinoy Maid Acts the Thug

It began thus…

According to a statement sent to the Global Times yesterday by the Chinese embassy in Manila, the embassy on Tuesday received a report that 12 Chinese fishing boats were in the lagoon of Huangyan Island in the South China Sea to shelter from harsh weather conditions when a Philippine Naval warship blocked the entrance to the lagoon.

The warship is the biggest in the Philippine navy, which was recently acquired from the US, according to the AP.

The embassy said 12 Philippine soldiers, six of whom were armed, entered the lagoon and harassed the Chinese fishermen.

In a statement posted on its official website yesterday, China’s State Oceanic Administration (SOA) said it ordered Haijian-84 and Haijian-75, which were in the area carrying out regular patrols, on Tuesday to protect the Chinese fishermen.

The SOA said the surveillance ships are still in the waters of Huangyan Island, and the fishermen, who were from Hainan Province, are safe.

The Philippine government said the two Chinese patrol ships were blocking efforts by its navy flagship vessel to arrest the fishermen, AFP reported. The AP quoted a Philippine navy official as saying that Manila was sending more vessels to the lagoon.

China’s Says

A Philippine warship was at a standoff with a Chinese patrol vessel and fishing boat yesterday around Huangyan Islet of the Nansha Islands yesterday. The attempt by the Philippines to expel and capture Chinese boats was not successful. The standoff continued as of last night while both sides expressed wishes to end the impasse peacefully.

The standoff happened in China’s conventional fishing areas. The Philippines has never had actual control of the Huangyan Islet. The response of the Chinese side has followed normal procedure when its assets were under military threat by the Philippines.

The patrol vessel can effectively protect Chinese fishing boats and crew without the participation of China’s navy as the incident has showed. This is progress in China exerting sovereignty over the Nansha Islands.

This reaction would change the expectations of other parties concerning China’s attitude toward South China Sea disputes. Peace and stability in the area are still what China strives for but it will not make unprincipled concessions to the recklessness of neighboring countries. A resolute response to protecting its interests should be expected from China.

The disputes are more complex when outside participants get involved. The US is encouraging the Philippines and Vietnam to take more risks.

Charting troubled waters needs a clear action plan. Disputes and harassment should not deter Chinese fishermen from their conventional fisheries. Unprotected fishing boats are often detained by neighboring countries. They need close escorts by patrol vessels, including to help with confrontations at times like these.

If Chinese fishing boats or vessels are attacked by navy ships belonging to the Philippines or Vietnam, it will signal the escalation of disputes. A response from the Chinese navy should be expected. Should a military clash happen in South China Sea, China will not fire the first shot but will react accordingly.

China is not willing to solve South China Sea disputes through military means. It has the patience to work out solutions with the countries concerned through negotiation. It has remained reserved in protecting its interests.

The Philippines is taking a radical approach to divert domestic pressure. But China will not compromise its principles to appease its fitful neighbor.

 China on North Korea

Since its announcement that it would launch the Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite in mid-April, North Korea has warned that any country that intercepts the long-range rocket would face retaliation and merciless punishment, has made intense preparations, and has installed the rocket for the planned satellite mission on the launch pad. Now the satellite launch is inevitable.

The US, Japan and South Korea insist this is a disguised long-range missile test, and vow to shoot down any part of the rocket that poses a threat. The tension in the Korean Peninsula is increasing day by day.

Some idealists call for enhancing mutual trust to dissolve suspicions, while some observers propose giving North Korea a chance to show its peaceful intentions.

It seems that many are underestimating the strategic considerations by countries involved in this incident. In fact, both sides have pondered before taking any actions, and seek to achieve several things at one stroke. Before long, people will find that in this game, the one who’s exposed to a real diplomatic ordeal is a party who’s not directly involved, China. China’s diplomacy may face up to five painful tests after the launch.

The first test is whether China should accept North Korea’s invitation to send observers to watch the satellite’s launch live. In a bid to demonstrate its peaceful intentions, North Korea has invited space agencies of eight countries to observe the planned satellite launch. The aerospace agencies of US, Japan and Russia have rejected the invitation, and now China has to make a choice.

If China accepts the invitation, this behavior itself would be a sign of support for the satellite’s launch, which contradicts China’s earlier voicing of concern of this satellite launch plan, and will inevitably trigger doubts and speculation among the international community. Besides, China will be forced to stand at the side of countries suspected of nuclear proliferation. But if China refused to send observers, it will face explicit anger and even further counteractions by North Korea.

The second test is whether China should raise a protest if the satellite deviates from its planned orbit and passes over the territory of Japan and South Korea.

North Korea may move the orbit westward, which raises the possibility of passing over Chinese territory. If this really takes place, and China voices its protest, the relationship between the two will plummet suddenly. But if China keeps silent, the public will surely be unhappy and doubt the government’s credibility.

The third test is whether China should vote for or against the likely draft resolution by the US, Japan and South Korea, after North Korea’s satellite launch is brought again to the UN Security Council for discussion. At that time, everyone will focus on China’s attitude.

China will have three choices. The first will be to support a draft resolution condemning North Korea, which will win applause from most countries in the international community, but enrage North Korea. The second is to exercise its veto. Then the US, Japan and South Korea will further see China as a supporter of North Korea’s “aggressive behavior” and as representing North Korea’s interests, and this will place greater pressure on China’s diplomatic, political and military affairs. China’s diplomatic and neighboring environment will further deteriorate.

China will most likely turn to the third option, proposing the release of a mild and symbolic chairman’s statement. But this option is most embarrassing and satisfies neither side.

The fourth test is which stand China will choose toward North Korea’s follow-up actions. No matter the UN Security Council passes a draft resolution or a chairman’s statement, North Korea will undoubtedly give an intense response.

At that time, it will be a question whether China should continue its long-held North Korea policy or conduct some adjustment. This is not only a problem of diplomacy and international politics, but one of domestic politics.

The fifth test is when facing the increasingly dangerous Peninsula dynamics, how China should respond to external criticism against China’s “generous aid” to North Korea. As North Korea has just experienced a leadership shift, China, with the stability-first mentality, has provided a great deal of food, oil and financial aid to North Korea.

This has been criticized by the international community as providing aid to a country that insists on military-first politics and nuclear development. US President Barack Obama has publicly censured China as being responsible for a series of moves by North Korea at the moment. It is a difficult problem how China can convince the international community that its aid to North Korea has nothing to do with this country’s current words and behaviors.

On Peninsula dynamics, there is some strategic thinking which advocates the return of Cold War structure and clique politics. China is embarrassed in this process. In recent years, the Peninsula dynamics have been full of rapid, unpredictable changes. But understanding these takes real wisdom.


Compare & Contrast: China’s 21st Century Ming Fleet

China’s City Busters

Taking the fight from the South China Sea to America:

“If you annihilate the top 20 American cities, you are talking about roughly 30 million dead plus nuclear fallout. This is called nuclear deterrence.”


Those above, all 5,000km – the Great Tunnel Wall (not for tourist) – are for these, below.


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